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The Morning After a General
Election: The Vice-Regal Perspective
Peter Neary
Everywhere in Canada, election night now produces a television extravaganza, with the
commentariat out in full force. The next day newspapers chime in with their reporting, as the
country wakes up to further analysis of what has happened and what the future might bring.
From the vice-regal perspective, however, the path to be followed after every election is always
clear and always the same: the conventions of responsible government must be respected and
politics eschewed. The vice-regal representative is the protector of the Constitution and not a
political actor: the job is to follow convention, stay away from party strife, and maintain the
legitimacy of the office. This article looks at the conventions and how they have worked in various
examples over the years.

I

n our Canadian democratic system, the electorate
ultimately decides matters – but indirectly through
elected members, and there can be surprising
outcomes. We have a government and a premier
or prime minister while an election campaign is in
progress, and the “term” of a premier or prime minister
is from the date of swearing in until the date of leaving
office, a period that can cover several elections and
legislatures (both realities are often forgotten).
If a general election in a province or in the country
as a whole produces a legislative majority for the
governing party, the administration of the day simply
carries on in office (that is what happened nationally
after May 2, 2011). If, following a general election,
no party commands a legislative majority, a number
of possibilities present themselves, and in these
circumstances the vice-regal representative may be
called upon to act – not politically but constitutionally,
in accordance with the conventions of responsible
government.
What are those conventions? One is that the viceregal representative has one adviser at a time (the
prime minister in Ottawa and the premier in a
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provincial capital) and, except when the maintenance
of responsible government itself is at stake, follows
the advice of that individual. Another is that for a
government to hold office it must have the confidence
of the elected chamber, the House of Commons in
Ottawa or the legislature of a province. Confidence
means majority support on crucial matters, supply
(money bills) being the leading example. If there is
doubt about the government’s standing with a newly
elected house, it must either resign or demonstrate
confidence forthwith. If after an election a government
that previously commanded a legislative majority finds
itself in a minority position (including being behind in
party standings), the prime minister or premier may
choose to resign or, if the opposition forces are divided,
meet the new house and test the government’s strength.
If the government is sustained by the newly elected
body, it can carry on. Alternatively, if it is immediately
defeated on a confidence vote, it has no choice but
to resign and give way to another administration,
assuming one can be formed (one can imagine a
second election being immediately necessary but this
seems most unlikely).
Who should govern is a matter for politicians to
sort out, though an administration could not carry on
simply by avoiding meeting a newly elected house.
If the existing government has to go, the vice-regal
representative acts when it is clear who can successfully
govern – that is to say, win votes of confidence. In all
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likelihood, following a Canadian election this will be
whoever can unite opposition groups into a governing
majority. But there is no guarantee that a governing
party that commands the largest number of seats but
not a majority will go on governing. For emergencies,
the vice-regal representative retains an unspecified
reserve power to deal with those situations – very
few and very far between – that cannot be dealt
with through the simple, well known, and accepted
conventions of responsible government.

sorted matters out, and David Cameron became prime
minister by going to Buckingham Palace and accepting
the Queen’s invitation to form a government. The
Queen gave legitimacy to what the politicians had
worked out among themselves and her action was
unchallenged.
Canadian Examples

In recent times the most striking example of the
latter came in 1967 when, on December 17, Prime
Minister Harold Holt of Australia went swimming
on a favourite beach and was never seen again. His
remains were not found and he was probably a
victim of drowning (though there have been many
wild theories). On December 19 the government of
Australia announced that Holt was presumed dead,
whereupon Governor General Lord Casey appointed
Deputy Prime Minister John McEwan as first minister.
Constitutionally, the totally unexpected was dealt with
smoothly and efficiently. In Canada, at the federal
level, a list, in rank order, of ministers who would
assume the prime minister’s duties in the event of
incapacity is now published and updated periodically
by the Privy Council Office. At the provincial level, the
position of deputy premier may meet the same need,
thereby ensuring a smooth transition if required.

The most famous case involving vice-regal discretion
is linked to the career of Prime Minister William
Lyon Mackenzie King, whose name by definition
looms large in any discussion of the conventions of
responsible government. In 1919 King became leader
of the Liberal Party and in 1921 became the first prime
minister to lead a minority government. Thanks to
continuing support of Progressive members (he called
them Liberals in a hurry) all went well for him until
1925, when his party suffered a serious reverse in the
general election held on October 29 (Conservatives,
116; Liberals, 99; Progressives, 24; others, 6). Included
in the fallen on the government side were eight cabinet
ministers and the prime minister himself, who was
defeated in North York (Ontario). Given this outcome,
one might expect the prime minister to have had
nothing on his mind the next day but election results,
but in fact his diary entry for October 30 begins with a
reflection on news from his fortune teller in Kingston
(Mrs. Bleaney) about the meaning of a recent dream
(whoever said the study of Canadian constitutional
history was dull?).

Recent events in the United Kingdom have
highlighted to advantage what can happen in that
country after the election of what the British call a
“hung parliament.” Following the general election
of May 6, 2010, which did not produce a majority
for any party but put the governing Labour Party in
second place in members elected, there was an intense
round of negotiations in which senior public servants
played a facilitating role. This eventually produced
an agreement between the Conservatives and Liberal
Democrats. While this agreement was in the making,
Prime Minister Gordon Brown made a clear distinction
between his political role as leader of the Labour Party
and his constitutional role as prime minister. Wearing
his political hat, he held out the possibility of a Labour/
Liberal Democrat arrangement to govern the country.
In his constitutional role, he understood that agreement
between the other parties would mean an immediate
change of government. When the Conservatives and
Liberal Democrats reached such an agreement, he
immediately left 10 Downing St., and the Conservative
leader, David Cameron, soon arrived there. The role
of the Crown in all this was symbolic: the politicians

At 6 p.m. the same day, the prime minister went
along to see the Governor General, Viscount Byng
of Vimy. After a polite tea involving Lady Byng and
other members of the household - “the talk was of the
weather, the cold, of gardens, etc.,” – the Governor
General and the prime minister repaired to the library
for the first of a series of discussions about the next step
constitutionally.1 In the back and forth that followed
over the next few days, Byng urged King to give way
to a Conservative government but the prime minister,
backed by the cabinet (and prominent constitutional
lawyer and close adviser J.S. Ewart), decided to meet
Parliament and let it decide who should govern.
Throughout his discussions with Byng, King argued
that whatever the Governor General might think
privately, “in a public way…he was bound by the
advice of his Ministers.”2 Ewart told the prime minister
that Byng “had no right to express an opinion” or
to ask the prime minister “to do anything.”3 It was
for King “to acquaint him with the general political
situation” and “to tender him advice if requested.” In
the same spirit, King told the Governor General that
it would be “unwise” for them to correspond about

Examples from Abroad
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present business and that there must be “complete
confidence” between them.4 As Governor General, he
mused, Byng could have “no opinions.”5 This position
was supported by cabinet, where King found “great
indignation that the Governor General should have
any views.”6
King got his way, though to satisfy the Governor
General he issued a carefully drafted news release. On
the crucial matter of who had the right to govern in
existing circumstances, King had this to say:
With respect to the leader of the political party
having the largest definite following in the
House of Commons being called upon to form
an Administration, the Cabinet holds the view
that responsible self-government in Canada rests
upon the principle that the majority are entitled
to govern, the majority so understood meaning,
not the political party or group having the
largest number of members, but the majority as
determined by the duly elected representatives
of the people in Parliament.…I am not aware of
any precedent in Great Britain or in Canada for
recommending, before Parliament meets, that
the leader of a party not commanding a clear
majority in the House of Commons should be
called upon to form a Government
To summon Parliament and to allow the
House of Commons to disclose its attitude
upon division is the procedure warranted by
constitutional precedent and by the present
circumstances. To take any other course would
be to fail to recognize the supreme right of the
people to govern themselves in the manner
which the Constitution has provided, namely,
expressing their will through their duly elected
representatives in Parliament and in accordance
with recognized Parliamentary practice.7

Act 2 of this political and constitutional drama
started when the newly elected House of Commons
began sitting on January 8, 1926. During this act, the
private difference between the Governor General
and his prime minister that had manifested itself
immediately after the 1925 election became a public
issue.8 In short, actions of the Governor General
became a matter of political debate. Not surprisingly,
the Conservative opposition, with more seats than the
governing Liberals, looked for every opportunity to
bring King’s government down - that is to say, defeat
it on a matter of confidence. When, eventually, the
government faced imminent defeat, King made three
separate requests for dissolution. In one of the most
celebrated actions ever taken by a Governor General,
Byng refused his prime minister, whereupon King
resigned from office on June 28, 1926.
Conservative leader Arthur Meighen became prime
minister the next day but, in the early hours of July

2, the new government was defeated by one vote
on a confidence motion (a Manitoba Progressive
member, said to have just woken up, voted against
the government despite being paired with another
Progressive MP who favoured the Tories). Meighen
then requested a dissolution, which was granted. In
the campaign that followed, leading up to the general
election of September 14, 1926, King argued that the
Governor General had acted unconstitutionally by
refusing his own request for dissolution and that
Prime Minister Meighen had acted improperly in
forming a government under these circumstances. In
the event, King‘s Liberals carried the day, winning
128 of 245 seats in the House of Commons; the
Conservatives won 91, the Progressives 20, and others
6. On September 25 King again became prime minister
and three days later Lord Byng exited Ottawa. Now
leading a majority government, King, who never let a
slight pass, subsequently noted that he did not receive
a Christmas card from the Byngs in 1926.9
Since these seminal events of 1925-26 – described
by one scholar as the Rosetta Stone of the Canadian
constitution: that is to say, events that facilitate the
deciphering of all subsequent events – no Governor
General has ever refused the advice of a prime minister
to dissolve Parliament. Nor, as we now all well know,
has any Governor General refused the advice of a prime
minister to prorogue Parliament. Nor has government
changed hands between parties during the life of what
we call a minority Parliament. These were elected in
1957, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1972, 1979, 2004, 2006, and 2008.
What happened constitutionally after each of them?
In the election of 1957 the Liberals, having been in
power since 1935, fell into second place in seats,
though leading in the popular vote. Following the
election, a couple of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s
ministers urged him to meet Parliament and seek a
vote of confidence. Backed by the cabinet as a whole,
however, St. Laurent decided to resign and make way
for Progressive Conservative leader John Diefenbaker
to form a government. Once the service vote was in (this
completed the election results), power changed hands
on June 21, the date chosen by Diefenbaker. The diehard
Jimmy Gardiner of Saskatchewan, who had wanted
St. Laurent to meet Parliament, long complained that,
“for the first time we have a government which came
into being when the House was not in session without
being able to demonstrate that it had the support either
of the greatest number of votes for its supporters, or
the support of a majority of those elected to the House
of Commons.”10 The Governor General’s role in all this
was to accept the resignation of one prime minister
and appoint another.
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When another election was held in 1958 (the Liberals
were now led by Lester Pearson), the Progressive
Conservatives won a big parliamentary majority,
but after the 1962 election they found themselves
again in a minority position. The government carried
on but suffered another setback in the election of
1963; this time the Liberals won the largest number
of seats of any party but not a majority. On election
night, Diefenbaker said on television that the results
reminded him of the outcome of the 1925 election
when Mackenzie King “had decided, as was his right,
to meet Parliament on the basis that no party had
a majority.”11 Pressed by close associates, however,
Diefenbaker accepted that resignation was in the cards,
but he made no public statement about this, saying
only that he would “watch eventualities.”12 Matters
came to a head when, on April 12, “six Créditiste MPs
delivered a sworn affidavit to the Governor General
and to Pearson declaring that the Liberal Party had
the right to form the next government and promising
their voting support to that government.”13 With the
Liberals thus positioned to win the confidence of the
House, Diefenbaker resigned and was succeeded
as prime minister by Pearson. Again, the role of the
Governor General was to accept the resignation of
one prime minister and swear in another – after the
politicians had sorted matters out among themselves.
Following the 1965 election, which saw the Liberals
increase their number of seats but not get a majority,
Pearson carried on in office and was succeeded, on
April 20, 1968, by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who then
led the Liberals to a majority in the election held
on June 25, 1968. When the election of 1972 put the
Liberals back into a minority position and saw the
defeat of four ministers, three members of cabinet,
most notably John Turner, favoured resignation.14
Progressive Conservative leader Robert Stanfield now
claimed the right to form a government, but Prime
Minister Trudeau, whose party had the largest number
of seats and the benefit of having led the popular
vote, carried on and, thanks to New Democratic Party
(NDP) support, was able to win confidence votes in the
new Parliament. In the election held on July 8, 1974 the
Liberals regained a majority.
When the Progressive Conservatives under Joe
Clark won the largest number of seats, but not a
majority, in the general election of May 22, 1979,
Trudeau advised Governor General Ed Schreyer to
call on the Conservative leader to form a government.
Clark was then sworn into office, on June 4. When
the new government lost a budget vote (specifically
framed as a confidence test) on December 13, the
Parliament elected in 1979 was dissolved and another
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general election held, on February 18, 1980. This
time the Liberals were returned with a majority and,
on March 3, 1980, Trudeau, who as leader of the
opposition had been planning to leave politics, again
became prime minister.
A series of other majority governments followed,
but in the election of June 28, 2004 the Liberal
government of Paul Martin, who had succeeded Jean
Chrétien as prime minister on December 12, 2003,
won the largest number of seats of any party but
not a majority. Prime Minister Martin’s government
carried on and won votes of confidence in the new
Parliament, but when the next election, held on
January 23, 2006, put the Liberals in second place in
seats won, Martin resigned and, on February 6, was
succeeded as prime minister by the present holder
of that office, Stephen Harper. In the federal election
held on October 14, 2008, the Conservatives increased
their seat total, but the government remained in
a minority position in Parliament. Prime Minister
Harper carried on in the office of first minister and met
the new Parliament successfully, winning a confidence
vote – on the address in reply to the Speech from the
Throne – on November 27, 2008, immediately after
the reading of the economic statement that triggered
a failed coalition understanding among the three
opposition parties. The timing of this crucial vote
was duly noted in a government news release issued
the following day, which quoted Government House
Leader Jay Hill as follows: “Acceptance by the House
of Commons of a Speech from the Throne is an
expression of confidence in the government.…I am
pleased that the House endorsed our government’s
general program, particularly with full knowledge
of the content of the Economic and Fiscal update.
Yesterday’s vote and today’s motion to communicate
with the Governor General accepting her Speech are
crucial demonstrations of Parliament’s affirmation of
our newly re-elected government.”15 Prime Minister
Harper eventually served longer at the head of a
minority government than any other Canadian first
minister. Now, of course, his party enjoys majority
support in the House of Commons.
It follows from the above, the events of 2008 in
particular - i.e., the coalition agreement and the
subsequent party controversy over coalition – that if
we elect a Parliament in which no party has a majority
and the government decides to stay on, the opposition
forces seemingly have but one chance to effect a
change in administration: before the new Parliament
votes confidence in the government (unless, of course,
– this is unlikely – a prime minister whose government
has enjoyed confidence for a time recommends to the

Governor General that a different party administration
be formed). A prime minister who has governed
successfully during the life of a Parliament – that is
to say, has enjoyed confidence, no matter how briefly
(this, surely, was the meaning of Jay Hill’s statement of
November 28, 2008) – has the weapon of dissolution in
his arsenal.
By convention, the advice of a prime minister to
dissolve Parliament, as with all prime ministerial advice
(other than advice that is illegal), must be accepted by
the Governor General. For a vice-regal representative
not to do this but set out on his or her own to find
another prime minister would be to venture onto the
slippery ground of politics (the very place where the
representative of the Crown must not go, multiple
urgings by academics, pundits, and assorted other
experts to the contrary). Recently, there has been much
speculation in Canada about how long a government
must govern successfully – though nobody can put a
minimum time on it – before a sitting prime minister’s
advice to dissolve has to be accepted by the Governor
General. Arguably, the advice of a prime minister who
has successfully won a single confidence vote in a new
Parliament must be honoured in relation to dissolution.
To act otherwise would be to go into politics and risk
a constitutional crisis. The vice-regal representative
can never go wrong by putting the final decision about
who should govern into the hands of the democratic
electorate, which is where, by definition, dissolution
puts it.
Provincial Examples
Since 1867 there have been dozens of provincial
general elections, but the aftermaths of some stand
out for the instructive examples they offer of the
conventions of responsible government in operation.
Events following the Manitoba election of 1922 are a
striking case in point: John Bracken became premier
of the province after an election in which he had
not been a candidate and in which he had not even
voted (it would be hard to find a better example
of the remarkable simplicity and flexibility of our
constitutional order). Following an electoral upset,
the winning but leaderless politicians sorted matters
out; Bracken was recruited by them to be premier,
and Lieutenant-Governor Sir James Albert Manning
Aikins then swore in a cabinet that commanded
majority support in the newly elected legislature –
that is to say, had the confidence of that body. Though
politics had taken an unusual and unexpected course,
the Constitution was equal to the occasion – and the
lieutenant-governor had stood above the political fray.
This is the norm.

The example of what happened in Ontario after that
province’s 1985 election is also most instructive about
how our constitutional system works. On February 8 of
that year Industry and Trade Minister Frank Miller, the
MPP for Muskoka, succeeded William Grenville Davis
as premier of the province. At the time, the Progressive
Conservatives had been in office continuously since
1943, but when the new government went to the polls
on May 2, its future was put in jeopardy. The result
in seats of the election was as follows: Conservative,
52; Liberal, 48; NDP, 25.16 By contrast, the popular
vote was split as follows: Liberal, 37.9%; Conservative,
37.0%; NDP, 23.8%; others, 1.3%.
Following the election, private meetings took place
between the Conservatives and the NDP and the
Liberals and the NDP to determine who would support
whom. The eventual outcome of these negotiations
was an “accord,” made public on May 28, between
the Liberals, led by David Peterson, and the NDP,
led by Bob Rae. This committed the two parties to a
legislative reform program, with the Liberals forming
the government and the NDP agreeing “that for a
period of two years it would neither move nor vote
non-confidence in the government.”17 For their part,
the Liberals “promised not to seek a dissolution unless
defeated by a specifically framed want of confidence
motion.”18 Despite all this, the Miller government
carried on, and on June 4, the new Legislature met
and heard Lieutenant-Governor John Black Aird read
the Speech from the Throne. The Conservatives had
already promised a budget speech on June 25, but the
immediate business was the address in reply to the
Speech from the Throne. Debate on this went on for
eight days and ended on June 18 with the passage,
by 72 votes to 52, of a motion of non-confidence in
the government. The next day Premier Miller saw the
lieutenant-governor and gave him a letter of resignation
in which he advised thus: “It would appear that the
Honorable Leader of the Opposition is able to gain the
confidence of the House at this time.”19
The same day Lieutenant-Governor Aird issued
a statement of his own about the formation of a new
government, as follows:
In my capacity as Lieutenant-Governor of
Ontario and as the representative of Her Majesty
the Queen in Ontario, I have this day asked Mr.
David Peterson to form a government, he having
assured me that he can form a government
which will have the confidence of the Legislative
Assembly for a reasonable length of time.
On the advice of counsel with whose opinions
I agree, I have advised Mr. Peterson that the
agreement between the Liberal Party and the
New Democratic Party, a copy of which had
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been delivered to me, has no legal force or
effect and that it should be considered solely as
a joint political statement of intent and that the
agreement cannot affect or impair the powers
or privileges of the Lieutenant-Governor of
Ontario nor of the members of the Legislative
Assembly.20

Finally, on June 26, in a public ceremony held on
the front lawn of the legislature and witnessed by
thousands, the new premier and his ministers were
sworn into office. Government had changed hands in
Ontario according to the conventions of responsible
government, with confidence being the deciding factor
and the lieutenant-governor playing his part after the
politicians had sorted matters out.
Correctly, Lieutenant-Governor Aird refused
interviews about his decision to call on David Peterson
to form a government, but when asked whether
history would “treat him kindly” had this to say: “I
don’t know whether history will or not. I think one
does one’s best at all times and that’s the standard I’ve
always tried to apply. Let the historians decide.”21 His
discretion was admirable and in fact his actions, which
accorded perfectly with the conventions of responsible
government, went unchallenged. Trust is at the heart
of the relationship of the vice-regal representative
and a premier or prime minister and, as Mackenzie
King had so clearly pointed out in 1925, this requires
confidentiality. What the premier or prime minister
says to the vice-regal representative stays with the
vice-regal representative and vice versa. That is not
always an easy fit with today’s 24/7 news cycle but it is
crucial nonetheless.
Recently, some have advocated that the Governor
General should give statements of reasons for decisions
made in relation to prorogation and dissolution using
the prerogative powers of the Crown. The present
practice of confidentiality, it has been argued, “is
inconsistent with the ‘culture of justification’ that has
emerged as a key constitutional value in Canada.”22 But
Professor Robert E. Hawkins of the Johnson-Shoyama
Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Regina,
has made a powerful case for the view that wideranging statements of reasons of the sort envisaged
would “inevitably draw the governor general into the
political fray.”23 “The role of the governor general,” he
writes, is “unique” and the constitution “contemplates
neither the politicization, nor the judicialization, of
that role.”24 Lieutenant-Governor Aird’s 1985 public
statement, of course, stayed within the letter of existing
conventions about the operation of responsible
government. He accepted the resignation of Premier
Miller, swore in a premier who could command the
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confidence of the newly elected legislature, and made
plain that a political accord had no constitutional
standing.
Much can also be learned about the conventions
of responsible government from events following
the British Columbia election of 1952 and the
Newfoundland election of 1971. In the former case,
an election conducted under a new voting system
(single transferable ballot), produced a result that led
to complex dealings between Lieutenant-Governor
Clarence Wallace and Social Credit Leader W.A.C.
Bennett, who was ultimately sworn in as premier
(on August 1, 1952).25 The Newfoundland election of
October 28, 1971 triggered a constitutional crisis, when
the Progressive Conservatives believed they had won
the election but Liberal Premier Joey Smallwood, who
had been in office since 1949, resisted calling the new
legislature together, despite Conservative appeals
to Lieutenant-Governor E. John A. Harnum that this
be done.26 Eventually, Smallwood resigned after the
Supreme Court of Newfoundland ruled in favour of
the Conservative candidate in the riding of St. Barbe
South, where a recount had been ordered but could not
be completed because of missing ballots. On January
18, 1972 Frank Moores finally succeeded Smallwood
as premier. The new House of Assembly then met
on 1 March but was dissolved the same day. In the
election that followed, on March 24, the Progressive
Conservatives won a commanding majority and the
good ship Terra Nova returned to even keel.
In dealing with demanding circumstances,
Lieutenant-Governor Harnum was advised by Eugene
Forsey, the country’s foremost constitutional expert
at the time and himself a Newfoundlander. Like
Lieutenant-Governor Aird, Harnum acted to the letter
within the framework of responsible government
and, in a highly charged political atmosphere, was
never criticized for the role he played. Forsey’s
successors in present-day Canada include Peter Hogg,
who advised Governor General Michaëlle Jean on
the issue of prorogation in 2008, and David Smith,
author of the authoritative The Invisible Crown: The
First Principle of Canadian Government. Citing the 197172 Newfoundland situation, Smith writes that “the
problem of the reserve power today is not so much
how to check the Crown’s use of it as how to prevent
the prime minister (or premier) from abusing it” by
“testing the limits of ‘responsible government.’”27
Conclusion
On September 1, 1939, with war approaching,
Governor General Lord Tweedsmuir asked Prime
Minister Mackenzie King’s advice on what he should

wear at the opening of the emergency session of
Parliament about to be called. Should he go in military
uniform or should he wear a black morning suit? King
said he “thought the Canadian people would prefer the
quieter way of proceeding” – that is to say, the morning
suit.28 In constitutional as much as sartorial matters,
“the quieter way of proceeding” – leaving politics to
the politicians – always has much to recommend it.
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